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THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
SOME FOREIGN STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES MUST
BE CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS
Gosia Spangenberg
Abstract: The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause places limitations on courts'
judicial power. Due process concerns arise when a forum exercises personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant for actions carried on outside the forum's territory. Those concerns
are alleviated when the defendant has adequate "minimum contacts" with the forum.
Although foreign states are presumed to be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over foreign states
under certain circumstances. Several FSIA exceptions to foreign state immunity extend to
conduct that occurs outside of the U.S. Moreover, the jurisdictional nexus requirements
associated with some of those exceptions do not necessarily satisfy due process requirements.
Seemingly, the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA would have to be consistent
with the requirements of due process embodied in the "minimum contacts" test. However, in
contrast to corporations, foreign states, like U.S. states, are not "persons" within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause and thus are not entitled to its protections. Nevertheless, because
the FSIA's definition of "foreign state" is broad, some entities that fall within its scope will
be entitled to constitutional treatment different from that of a foreign state. This Comment
argues that some foreign state instrumentalities are in fact "persons" entitled to a
constitutional personal jurisdiction defense. Accordingly, even when a court has jurisdiction
under the FSIA, the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over an instrumentality that is
created as a separate juridical entity not extensively controlled by a foreign state must be
consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, provided that such separate
treatment does not result in fraud or injustice.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution limits courts' exercise of judicial power over "persons."'
One effect of this limitation is that non-resident entities that qualify as
"persons" can generally be haled into court for actions carried on outside
of the forum's territory only when they have sufficient "minimum
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982) (stating that the personal jurisdiction requirement of the Due Process Clause
represents a restriction on judicial power). The Fourteenth Amendment uses parallel language to
impose due process requirements on the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This Comment,
as do cases concerning the personal jurisdiction requirement of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, cites to Fourteenth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,
504 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1992) (Fifth Amendment case citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (Fourteenth Amendment case); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (same)).
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contacts" with the forum.2 Conversely, entities that do not qualify as
''persons" are not entitled to the protections embodied in the "minimum
contacts" test.
3
The distinction between persons and non-persons has unique
applications with respect to U.S. courts' exercise of jurisdiction under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),4 which permits
plaintiffs to sue foreign states and their instrumentalities in U.S. courts.
5
Although foreign states, like U.S. states, are not considered "persons"
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause,6 courts presume that
foreign state instrumentalities should be treated as juridical entities
separate from foreign states.7 Thus, although foreign states are not
"persons," foreign state instrumentalities that are not extensively
controlled by a foreign state may be "persons" for due process purposes,
provided that such separate treatment does not result in fraud or
injustice.
Instrumentalities that qualify as "persons" should be able to raise a
personal jurisdiction defense when haled into a U.S. court.9 However,
because the FSIA authorizes nationwide and worldwide service of
process, making the relevant forum for a "minimum contacts" analysis
of such instrumentalities the entire country,'0 a court will lack personal
jurisdiction over such an instrumentality only in limited circumstances.
Such limited circumstances would arise if an instrumentality lacked
2. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
3. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (holding that U.S. states are
not "persons" under the Due Process Clause); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that foreign states are not "persons" under the Due
Process Clause).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000).
5. Id. § 1603(a) (defining "foreign state" to include its political subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities); id. § 1605 (providing exceptions to foreign state immunity).
6. Price, 294 F.3d at 96 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24).
7. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S.
611, 626-27, 629 (1983).
8. See TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 301-02 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(following Bancec and holding that a foreign state agency over which a foreign state has plenary
power is not entitled to constitutional status different from that of the foreign state).
9. Id. at 301.
10. See Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir.
1981) (stating that the relevant forum in an FSIA action is the entire U.S.); see also SEC v. Carrillo,
115 F.3d 1540, 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the relevant forum is the entire U.S. when a
federal statute provides for worldwide or nationwide service of process), dismissed on other
grounds, 325 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2003).
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"4minimum contacts" with the U.S." when neither service of process nor
the conduct underlying the action occurred in the U.S.'
2
Part I of this Comment describes the Due Process Clause's personal
jurisdiction requirement, as well as the availability of the personal
jurisdiction defense to various entities. Part II illustrates that not all
constitutional protections are available to foreign defendants. Part III
compares the FSIA nexus requirements to the constitutional "minimum
contacts" requirement and concludes that satisfying the former does not
always satisfy the latter. Part IV discusses that the law presumes that
instrumentalities are separate juridical entities from foreign states.
Finally, Part V argues that some foreign state instrumentalities may be
entitled to a personal jurisdiction defense derived from the Due Process
Clause.
1. THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION MUST BE
CONSISTENT WITH THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause controls courts' exercise
of personal jurisdiction over defendants.1 3 Generally, a court's exercise
of personal jurisdiction is constitutional when a nonresident defendant
has "minimum contacts" with the forum. 14 However, this Due Process
Clause safeguard does not extend to entities that do not qualify as
"persons," such as U.S. states and foreign countries.15
A. The Due Process Clause Constrains a Court's Exercise of
Personal Jurisdiction
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no
person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
11. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (defining the "minimum
contacts" test); infra Part V.B (arguing that the personal jurisdiction defense is available to an
instrumentality that has no previous voluntary contacts with the U.S.).
12. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 607, 619 (1990); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 (1984).
13. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1992); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). The Due Process Clause also
requires that a defendant receive notice of a pending action and be given an opportunity to be heard.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
14. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
15. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (U.S. states); Price v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (foreign states).
449
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process of law."06 This language, known as the Due Process Clause,
controls courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants and
therefore imposes limitations on courts' judicial power. 17 In Pennoyer v.
Neff, 8 the United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he authority of
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State
in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond
those limits would be ... an illegitimate assumption of power."1 9 Thus,
courts must exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants in accordance
with due process limitations.2 °
B. The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction over a Defendant Who Has
"Minimum Contacts" with a Forum Satisfies the Due Process
Clause
Due process concerns arise in cases that involve extraterritorial
conduct and nonresident defendants. 2' In such circumstances, a court can
exercise personal jurisdiction in line with the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment when the defendant has "minimum contacts with [the
forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."', 22 In addition, a court can
exercise personal jurisdiction when a cause of action arises out of an
activity that a defendant carried on within the forum,23 when the
defendant waives the personal jurisdiction defense by appearance or
consent,24 or when the defendant is served with process while physically
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See Ins. Corp. ofIr., 456 U.S. at 702.
18. 95 U.S. 714(1877).
19. Id. at 720. In Pennoyer, statements regarding the Fourteenth Amendment are technically dicta
as the case involved a judgment rendered two years prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and was resolved on the principles of public law. See Burnham v. Superior Court of
Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 616-17 (1990).
20. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702.
21. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n.9 (citing Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)) (explaining that a court has constitutionally
valid "general jurisdiction" if the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum).
22. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457,463 (1940)).
23. Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414 & n.8 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204
(1977)) (explaining that a court has constitutionally valid "specific jurisdiction" over a defendant
when a cause of action arises out of an activity carried on within the forum).
24. Ins. Corp. ofIr., 456 U.S. at 703-04.
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present in the forum.25
The foundation for "minimum contacts" is established when a
defendant engages in activities within the forum, thereby invoking "the
benefits and protections of [the forum's] laws. 6 Such a defendant can
foresee being "haled into Court" in that forum.27 In evaluating whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is
reasonable, courts consider such factors as the burden placed on the
defendant and the interests of the forum, the plaintiff, and the interstate
judicial system.28
When exercising jurisdiction under a federal statute that provides for
nationwide or worldwide service of process, a federal court will evaluate
a defendant's "minimum contacts" with the entire U.S. rather than a
particular forum state.29 Because "service of process constitutes the
vehicle by which the court obtains jurisdiction, 30 a statute that
authorizes nationwide or worldwide service broadens the scope of
personal jurisdiction to the entire country. 31 Actions based on federal
statutes also implicate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
which requires that defendants have "minimum contacts" with the U.S.
32
C. Only Entities that Qualify as "Persons " Are Entitled to Due
Process Protections
Due Process Clause safeguards apply only to "persons. 33 However,
the term "persons" encompasses more than just natural persons. 34 For
instance, courts have treated corporations as "persons" for due process
25. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
26. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted).
27. Id. at 119 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)) (internal
quotations omitted).
28. See id. at 113.
29. See SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1997), dismissed on other grounds, 325
F.3d 1268 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
30. Id. (quoting United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir.
1992)) (internal quotations omitted).
31. Id. (citing Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Corp., 885 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1989)).
32. Id. (quoting United Elec. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1085). In diversity cases, a federal court is
limited by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and evaluates contacts with a particular
forum state. Id.
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (extending Due Process
Clause protections to a corporation).
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purposes.35 In contrast, courts have declined to extend "person" status to
U.S. states and foreign countries.36
1. Domestic and Foreign Corporations Are "Persons"
The Supreme Court has extended due process protections to
corporations.37 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,38 the Court
articulated the "minimum contacts" test and found Washington's
exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state domestic
corporation constitutional.39 In two cases involving foreign corporations,
the Court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction violated the Due
Process Clause. n°
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,4 1 the
Court considered whether it was consistent with due process to assert
personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer based on the
manufacturer's mere awareness that the stream of commerce might bring
its product into the forum.4a A plurality of justices concluded that, absent
other contacts, mere awareness did not amount to the "minimum
contacts" necessary to subject a defendant to a forum's jurisdiction. 3
The majority held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction at issue
violated the Due Process Clause on grounds that it was unreasonable and
35. See, e.g., id.
36. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (holding that U.S. states are
not "persons"); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (holding that foreign states are not "persons"); Rux v. Republic of Sudan, No. Civ.A.
2:04CV248, 2005 WL 2086202, at *18 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2005) (holding that foreign states are not
"persons").
37. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984); Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
Because these were cases based on diversity jurisdiction, the Court evaluated the defendants'
contacts with particular forum states, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
See Carrillo, 115 F.3d at 1543 (quoting UnitedElec. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1085). In diversity cases,
a federal court is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and evaluates
contacts with a particular forum state. Id.
38. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
39. See id. at 316, 321.
40. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116; Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 418-19. In neither Asahi
nor Helicopteros Nacionales did the Court evaluate whether the defendants had a "sufficient
connection" with the U.S. prior to evaluating their "minimum contacts" with the forum state.
41. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
42. See id. at 105.
43. See id. at 112-13 (plurality opinion).
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unfair under the circumstances of the case. 4
The Court also extended due process protections to a foreign
corporation in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,45 an
action that arose from a helicopter crash in Peru that killed four U.S.
citizens.46 The Colombian corporation's contacts with the forum
included cashing checks drawn on a Texas bank, making purchases from
a Texas corporation, and sending its employees to training and a contract
negotiation session in Texas. 47 The Court held that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction based on these contacts, which were unrelated to
the cause of action and were not continuous and systematic, violated the
Due Process Clause.48 In short, the Supreme Court has consistently
treated foreign, as well as domestic, private corporations as "persons"
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
2. U.S. States Are Not "Persons, "but Some State Agents May Be
"Persons"
The Supreme Court stated in South Carolina v. Katzenbach49 that
"[t]he word 'person' in the context of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be
expanded to encompass the States of the Union."50 In that case, South
Carolina challenged on due process grounds a federal statute that sought
to eliminate discriminatory voting eligibility devices.5 Early in its
analysis and without explaining its rationale, the Court concluded that
states were not entitled to due process protections by virtue of not being
"person[s]. ' 52
Since Katzenbach, lower courts have held that states' political
subdivisions, such as cities and counties, cannot assert constitutional due
process claims. 3 Additionally, in a case before the U.S. Court of
44. See id. at 116 (majority opinion).
45. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
46. See id. at 409-10.
47. See id. at 416.
48. See id. at 415-16.
49. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
50. Id. at 323.
51. Id. at 307-08.
52. Id. at 323-24.
53. See City of East St. Louis v. Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Cir., 986 F.2d 1142,
1144 (7th Cir. 1993); Appling County v. Mun. Elec. Auth. of Ga., 621 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (5th Cir.
1980).
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the U.S. and the court agreed that the U.S.
itself does not have due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.5 4 On
the whole, these decisions strongly suggest that sovereigns-whether the
U.S. or U.S states-are not "persons" within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause.
55
On the other hand, the Third Circuit has held that requiring a school
board to litigate in a forum in which it has no "minimum contacts"
violates due process. 56 The court reasoned that even though a school
board is a state actor, it is a limited entity that concerns itself with a
specific and restricted purpose. 57 The court concluded that school boards
are more akin to private corporations than to states and therefore
constitute "persons" entitled to the Fifth Amendment's due process
protections. 58 Thus, despite U.S. states not being "persons," the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over some public entities that act like private
entities may have to be consistent with the Due Process Clause.
3. Foreign States Are Not "Persons"
Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly on the due
process status of foreign states, it has strongly suggested that they are
not "persons., 59 In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,60 the Court
assumed that foreign states were "person[s]" entitled to due process
protections.6' Immediately following this statement, however, the Court
cited Katzenbach, which explicitly held that U.S. states are not
54. United States v. Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir. 1990)
(adjudicating a claim relating to the Internal Revenue Service).
55. See id.; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24.
56. See In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Serv. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 765 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821 (1989).
57. See id. at 765 n.3.
58. See id. This reasoning was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in a case that involved school boards
challenging the constitutionality of a federal act. See Bd. of Natural Res. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937,
943 (9th Cir. 1993). Compare id. (holding that school districts are persons under the Fifth
Amendment), with Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1244
& n.2 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Brown and holding that school boards lack standing to bring a
claim under the Supremacy Clause).
59. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 & n.2 (1992) (assuming,
without deciding, that foreign states are "persons" even though the constitutional status of Argentina
was not before the Court).
60. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
61. Id. at 619.
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"persons" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.62 According to
the Court, its previous cases that assume that a particular entity is a
"person" are not binding when a subsequent case requires a resolution of
that precise issue. In Weltover, the Court hinted that the assumption
that foreign states are "persons" would not be upheld on a direct
challenge. 64
Relying on Katzenbach and citing Weltover, the D.C. Circuit has
explicitly held that foreign states are not "persons" within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause. 65 In Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya,66 two Americans brought an action against Libya for torture
and hostage-taking under the FSIA's terrorism exception.67 Other than
the allegation that Libya tortured two Americans within its territory,
Libya did not have any contacts with the U.S. and challenged the court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction on due process grounds.68 The court
noted that the mere fact that a plaintiff is a citizen of a particular forum
and is a victim of an intentional tort elsewhere does not give that forum
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.69
In Price, the court recognized that whether a foreign state can rely on
a personal jurisdiction defense depends on its status under the Due
Process Clause. 70 To arrive at the holding that foreign states are not
"persons," the court began by noting that the Supreme Court presumes
that the term "person," when encountered in statutes, does not ordinarily
refer to sovereigns.7' More importantly, the court relied on Katzenbach
62. See id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966)).
63. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 n.4, 65 (1989) (holding that a U.S.
state is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
64. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24).
65. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see
also Rux v. Republic of Sudan, No. Civ.A. 2:04CV248, 2005 WL 2086202, at *18 (E.D. Va. Aug.
26, 2005). In 2005, the D.C. Circuit extended the Price holding to a foreign state's agency over
which the foreign state exercised complete control. See TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of
Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 300, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
66. 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
67. Id. at 85 (stating that plaintiffs brought the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)).
68. Id. at 95.
69. See id. The outcome may differ if other contacts exist or if the defendant "expressly aimed its
tortious conduct at the forum." Id. (quoting IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d
Cir. 1998)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 96 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (holding that
a state is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983)).
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in stating that "it would be highly incongruous to afford greater Fifth
Amendment rights to foreign nations, who are entirely alien to our
constitutional system, than are afforded to the states, who help make up
the very fabric of that system., 72 The court reasoned that, unlike
individuals, foreign states resort to the mechanisms of international law
to resolve disputes.73 It characterized foreign states as "juridical equals"
of the U.S. and stated that their interactions with the U.S. are generally
regulated by the principles of comity and international law and not the
Constitution.74
The D.C. Circuit saw authority in prior Supreme Court decisions for
the proposition that the interactions between the U.S. and foreign states
are generally not governed by the Constitution.75 For example, the
Supreme Court has held that an individual's right to have access to
courts is derived from the Due Process Clause,76 whereas a foreign
state's ability to sue a private party in a U.S. court is a matter of
comity. 77 Similarly, the source of foreign state immunity is the principle
78
of comity and not the Constitution. About a year after the Price
decision, the Court reiterated that foreign sovereign immunity grants
"protection from the inconvenience of suit as a gesture of comity
between the United States and other sovereigns.,
79
Other Circuits have not yet squarely confronted the issue of foreign
states' Due Process Clause status. 80 For now, the Second Circuit adheres
to an approach established in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria,81 a case decided prior to Weltover, which requires a
72. Id. at 96.
73. Id. at 98.
74. Id. at 97 (quoting Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV.
483, 521 (1987)) (internal quotations omitted).
75. See id.
76. See id. (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 579 (1974); Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907)).
77. See id. at 98 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1964)).
78. See id. at 99 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)); see also
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 416, 417-18 (citing Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 303-04 (1918)) (stating that the act of state doctrine, which prevents the judicial branch from
inquiring into the validity of public acts of a foreign sovereign within its territory, is a matter of
comity).
79. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,479 (2003) (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486).
80. See Rux v. Republic of Sudan, No. Civ.A. 2:04CV248, 2005 WL 2086202, at *18 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 26, 2005).
81. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
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82
constitutional due process analysis with respect to foreign states.
However, since Weltover, the Second Circuit has expressed uncertainty
about the Texas Trading holding. 83 Similarly, the Ninth and Eleventh
circuits have not, thus far, confronted this issue and continue to evaluate
foreign states' "minimum contacts. 84 Nonetheless, in light of Supreme
Court precedent that has denied "person" status to U.S. states, 85 and the
Court's repeated statements that interactions between foreign states and
the U.S. are governed by comity rather than the Constitution, 86 foreign
states are not "persons" entitled to a constitutional personal jurisdiction
defense. 87
In sum, because foreign states do not qualify as "persons," they can
be haled into court without regard to the limitations of the Due Process
Clause. In contrast, corporations, as well as some state agents that act
like corporations, can challenge a court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction when they lack contacts with the forum. Furthermore, the
relevant forum for a "minimum contacts" analysis under a federal statute
that authorizes nationwide or worldwide service of process is the entire
U.S.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS
AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
In some circumstances constitutional protections are not available to
foreign defendants.8 8 For example, in United States v. Verdugo-
82. See id. at 313-15; see also U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d
135, 152 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA must also
comport with the Due Process Clause).
83. See Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negra Indon. (Persero), 148 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 1998).
84. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 970 (9th Cir. 2002), affd on different
grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004); S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1303-04
(1 th Cir. 2000).
85. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
86. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003) (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent.
Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294
F.3d 82, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-
09 (1964)).
87. See Price, 294 F.3d at 99.
88. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269, 274-75 (1990). In addition, the
extent of protections afforded to aliens may differ from that afforded to U.S. citizens, as is the case
with immigration matters. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003) (quoting Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
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Urquidez,89 the Supreme Court held that Fourth Amendment restrictions
on searches and seizures did not apply to a search of a Mexican citizen
in Mexico when he did not have any voluntary connection with the
U.S.90 Courts have occasionally cited this decision to support the
proposition that Fifth Amendment protections also do not apply to
foreign defendants who have not established a sufficient connection with
the U.S. 91 If this principle were extended to the Due Process Clause, a
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who
had no connection with the U.S.92
Significantly, in Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court contrasted the language
of the Fifth and Fourth Amendments.93 The former applies to "any
person ' 94 whereas the latter applies the "the people." 95 The Court
concluded that the Fourth Amendment extends to those who have a
"sufficient connection with this country [so as] to be considered part of
that community. ' '96 It further noted that the historical purpose of the
Fourth Amendment was to restrain the actions of the government against
the people of the U.S. and not against aliens outside of its territory.97
Continuing the analysis in Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court
relied on prior decisions that held certain constitutional protections
inapplicable in U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines,
as well as overseas, for the proposition that the exercise of government
power is not always constrained by every constitutional provision.98 For
example, in Johnson v. Eisentrager,99 the Court rejected the availability
of habeas corpus relief based on the violations of the Fifth Amendment
89. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
90. See id. at 274-75.
91. See TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 302 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2004). But see Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[a]ll would agree ... that the dictates of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant" who is in front of an Article IIl
court).
92. However, the Court has extended due process protections to aliens residing in the U.S. See
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953). See supra Part I.A-B for a discussion of
the Due Process Clause limitations and the relevant forum for a "minimum contacts" analysis.
93. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264-65.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
96. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
97. See id. at 266.
98. See id. at 268 (citations omitted).
99. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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to enemy aliens who were captured, tried, and imprisoned abroad by the
executive branch.'00 The Court then cited numerous cases that have
granted constitutional rights to aliens who have come within U.S.
territory'0 ' and ultimately concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply extraterritorially to an alien who had no voluntary connection with
the U.S. 10 2
In sum, constitutional protections are not always available to foreign
defendants. The Fourth Amendment's search and seizure protections do
not extend to those who have not established a sufficient and voluntary
connection with the U.S. If this were also the case with respect to the
Due Process Clause, the personal jurisdiction defense would not be
available to foreign defendants who qualify as "persons" and who have
no contacts or insufficient contacts with the U.S. Such an outcome
appears to be incompatible with the limit that the personal jurisdiction
requirement embodied in the "minimum contacts" test imposes on the
courts' extraterritorial power.
III. NEXUS REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH SOME FSIA
EXCEPTIONS FALL SHORT OF "MINIMUM CONTACTS"
A plaintiff who wishes to sue a foreign state in a U.S. court must do
so under the FSIA. 10 3 However, whether a plaintiffs cause of action
satisfies an FSIA exception to foreign state immunity is a separate issue
from whether a court has constitutionally dictated personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. 1°4 In fact, contacts that satisfy the FSIA's nexus
requirements do not necessarily satisfy the "minimum contacts" test."'
A. The FSIA Provides the Sole Jurisdictional Basis for Bringing an
Action Against a Foreign State
Congress enacted the FSIA in order to provide legal redress against
foreign states and their political subdivisions, agents, and
100. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 (citing Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. at 781).
101. See id. at 270-71 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 274-75.
103. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989); see
also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000).
104. See Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir.
1981).
105. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618-20 (1992).
459
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instrumentalities. 0 6 Because the statute's text, structure, and legislative
history reflect an intent on the part of Congress "to enact a
comprehensive statutory scheme," °10 7 the Supreme Court has held that
the FSIA provides the only authorization for exercising jurisdiction over
foreign states. 10 8 Thus, a plaintiff cannot invoke any statute other than
the FSIA to bring an action against a foreign state.'0 9
The FSIA intertwines the concepts of sovereign immunity, subject
matter jurisdiction, and personal jurisdiction. 1° Under the statute,
foreign states are presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts unless their conduct falls within a waiver, commercial activity,
expropriation, property in the U.S., noncommercial tort, arbitration,
terrorism, admiralty, or counterclaims exception to immunity."' The
FSIA grants district courts original jurisdiction over claims asserted
against foreign states that satisfy one of these exceptions. 12 A court has
statutory personal jurisdiction whenever it has subject matter jurisdiction
over a claim and the defendant has been properly served. 1 3 The statute
specifies procedures related to service of process, time to answer, and
default.' '4 Its final three sections define which assets are subject to
attachment and execution upon a court judgment.' 15
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (defining "foreign state"); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605 (recognizing that foreign states' increasing participation
in commercial activities led to ordinary legal disputes that deserved redress). Though early in U.S.
history foreign states enjoyed absolute immunity, the U.S. eventually moved away from the
absolute theory and adopted a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity under which sovereigns are
entitled to immunity only in relation to their public acts but not private or commercial acts. See
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976) (reprinting Letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser for the Sec'y of State, to the U.S. Att'y Gen. (May 19,
1952), 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952)).
107. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 435 n.3.
108. See id. at 434-35. The Supreme Court also held that the FSIA's grant of jurisdiction arises
under federal law for the purposes of Article III of the Constitution. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent.
Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494 (1983).
109. See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 443.
110. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1605.
111. Id. §§ 1604-1605, 1607.
112. Id. § 1330(a).
113. Id. § 1330(b).
114. See id. § 1608.
115. See id. §§ 1609-1611.
Vol. 81:447, 2006
FSIA Instrumentalities' Due Process Clause Status
B. The Exercise of Jurisdiction Under the FSIA Can Raise Due
Process Concerns
Most FSIA exceptions to foreign state immunity contain a U.S. nexus
requirement. 1 6 However, a case can satisfy some of these exceptions
when its underlying conduct occurs outside of the U.S. 1 7 Moreover, the
statute's nexus requirements do not necessarily equate to the personal
jurisdiction requirement embodied in the "minimum contacts" test.118
1. The FSIA Applies To Conduct Occurring Outside of the U.S.
The FSIA's scope is not limited to conduct occurring within U.S.
territory. 19 Two of its exceptions apply solely within the U.S.: courts
have jurisdiction over claims that determine the rights of property
located in the U.S.,1 20 and over certain noncommercial torts that occur in
the U.S.121 The remaining exceptions, either explicitly or implicitly,
remove the immunity bar even when the underlying conduct occurs
extraterritorially.
22
2. Some of the FSIA's U.S. Nexus Requirements Do Not Equal
"Minimum Contacts"
The FSIA's personal jurisdiction requirement is satisfied whenever a
court has subject matter jurisdiction and the defendant has been properly
served. 123 The statute's legislative history suggests that Congress
intended this provision to embody the constitutional due process
"minimum contacts" requirement. 124 However, the FSIA's text does not
make this intent explicit and courts have generally refused to read a
116. See id. § 1605(a)(2)-(7). The waiver and admiralty exceptions do not contain a U.S. nexus
requirement. See id. § 1605(a)(1), (b).
117. See id. §§ 1605(a)(1)-(3), (6)-(7), 1605(b), 1607.
118. See infra Part III.B.2.
119. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1)-(3), (6)-(7), 1605(b), 1607.
120. Id. § 1605(a)(4).
121. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
122. See id. § 1605(a)(l)-(3), (6)-(7), 1605(b). Though the counterclaims exception could also
apply to extraterritorial conduct, the foreign state would have chosen to litigate in a U.S. forum. See
id. § 1607.
123. Id. § 1330(b).
124. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13-14 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6612
(stating that the requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice are embodied
in 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b)).
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"minimum contacts" requirement into the statute's exceptions. 25
Instead, most courts undertake separate evaluations of the statutory and
constitutional personal jurisdiction requirements. 126 Resorting to a two-
step inquiry suggests that jurisdictional contacts required by the statute
will not necessarily equate to the "minimum contacts" that the
Constitution requires. 
27
The commercial activity exception to foreign state immunity is an
example of an FSIA exception containing a U.S. nexus requirement that
does not embody "minimum contacts." 128 One way to satisfy this
exception is to show that a foreign state's act carried on outside of U.S.
territory had a "direct effect" in the U.S.' 29 The Supreme Court has
refused to view this provision as incorporating a requirement of
substantiality or foreseeability. 130 All that is necessary for an act to have
a "direct effect" is that the act's effect be "an immediate consequence of
the defendant's ... activity."13 1 In Weltover, the Court held that
Argentina's failure to make contractual payments to foreign
corporations' New York accounts had a "direct effect" in the U.S.1 32 In
contrast, the Court based its finding that "minimum contacts" existed on
two additional factors: Argentina chose to denominate financial
instruments in U.S. dollars payable in New York and appointed a New
York financial agent.' 33 The contact that satisfied the FSIA's nexus
requirement did not independently satisfy the "minimum contacts"
125. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (rejecting the
argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) contains an unexpressed requirement of substantiality or
foreseeability); Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313
n.36 (2d Cir. 1981). Contra Waukesha Engine Div. v. Banco Nacional De Fomento, 485 F. Supp.
490, 492 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (stating that "due process notions of minimum contacts have been
incorporated in the Act").
126. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2002), affd on different
grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004); U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d
135, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2001); S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1303-04
(11th Cir. 2000); Tex. Trading, 647 F.2d at 313.
127. See Tex. Trading, 647 F.2d at 308 (stating that the FSIA "cannot create personal jurisdiction
where the Constitution forbids it").
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1992).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
130. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
131. Id. (quoting Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991))
(internal quotations omitted).
132. Id. at 618-19.
133. See id. at 619-20.
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requirement.1 34 Thus, contacts that have a "direct effect" in the U.S. can
be different from contacts that satisfy the Due Process Clause. 1
35
Satisfying the expropriation exception's jurisdictional nexus
requirement does not automatically satisfy the personal jurisdiction due
process requirement.' 36 An FSIA action can be predicated upon an
expropriation of property in violation of international law where "that
property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or
operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the
United States."'137 Even when the expropriation occurs extraterritorially,
a U.S. court could have FSIA jurisdiction based upon an agency's single
and unrelated act or transaction carried on within the U.S.' 38 Under these
circumstances, a court would not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant as required by the Due Process Clause. 1
39
In addition, Congress amended the FSIA in 1996 to include the
terrorism exception 40 and departed from the original approach of
incorporating substantial jurisdictional contacts into the statute.' 41 The
terrorism exception applies to foreign states designated by the
Department of State as state sponsors of terrorism that are involved in
acts of "torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage
taking.' ' 142 This exception's jurisdictional nexus requirement is based
134. See id. at 618-20.
135. See id.
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000).
137. Id.
138. See id. § 1603(d) (defining "commercial activity" as "regular course of commercial conduct
or a particular commercial transaction or act").
139. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984) (holding
that the exercise of general jurisdiction over a Colombian corporation that had some commercial
contacts with the forum was improper under the Due Process Clause when those contacts were
unrelated to the cause of action, a helicopter crash in Peru).
140. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 110
Stat. 1214, 1241-42 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)). In addition, the Flatow Amendment to the
FSIA provides a cause of action for suits against agents of state sponsors of terrorism. See Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-172
(1996) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note).
141. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983) (stating that the FSIA
provisions as of 1983 require "some form of substantial contact with the United States").
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). The Department of State currently designates Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201
(2005).
Washington Law Review
solely on nationality. 143 It requires that either the claimant who brings
the action or the victim of terrorism be a U.S. national. 44 Since states
designated as sponsors of terrorism do not maintain normal relations
with the U.S., and since the mere fact that a victim or claimant is an
American may not provide requisite "minimum contacts," the
application of this exception could fall short of satisfying due process.1
45
In sum, the FSIA grants jurisdiction over actions against foreign
states that satisfy the statute's exceptions to foreign state immunity.
Under several exceptions, an action can be based on conduct occurring
outside of the U.S. Even though each FSIA exception contains a U.S.
nexus requirement, contacts that satisfy this requirement do not
necessarily satisfy constitutional due process. This can be the case under
the commercial activity, expropriation, and terrorism exceptions to
foreign state immunity.
IV. THE FSIA APPLIES TO INSTRUMENTALITIES, WHICH ARE
PRESUMED TO BE SEPARATE ENTITIES
The FSIA applies to foreign states as well as their instrumentalities.
46
The Supreme Court has established that instrumentalities are presumed
to be separate juridical entities from foreign states. 147 An instrumentality
is not entitled to this presumption when the foreign state extensively
controls the instrumentality or when separate treatment would result in
fraud or injustice.148
A. The FSIA Definition of a "Foreign State " Includes
Instrumentalities
The FSIA grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over "foreign states.' 49
Under the statute, this term includes foreign states' political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.5 0 The statute differentiates
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii).
144. Id.
145. See Price, 294 F.3d at 90, 95; see, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (prohibiting U.S. persons from
engaging in financial transactions with states designated as sponsors of terrorism).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
147. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S.
611, 626-27 (1983).
148. See id. at 629-30.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1330.
150. Id. § 1603(a).
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between foreign states and political subdivisions on one hand, and
agencies and instrumentalities on the other, with respect to the
expropriation exception to immunity,151 punitive damages,1 2 service of
process,153 execution of judgments,154 and venue. 155 Generally, an
agency or instrumentality receives fewer protections than the foreign
state or its political subdivisions. 
156
In order to satisfy the definition of an agency or instrumentality, an
entity must fulfill three requirements. 57  First, an agency or
instrumentality must be a "separate legal person. ' 1 58 Second, such an
entity must be either an organ of a foreign state or its political
subdivision, or an entity in which a foreign state or its political
subdivision owns a majority of shares or "other ownership interest." 159
Third, an agency or instrumentality cannot be a citizen of the U.S. or any
third country. 
160
B. Courts Presume that Instrumentalities Are Separate Juridical
Entities from Foreign States
According to the Supreme Court, "government instrumentalities
established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their
sovereign should normally be treated as such."' 16 1 In First National City
Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec),162 the
Court addressed when the acts and liabilities of a foreign state can be
attributed to a state-owned instrumentality established as a separate
151. Id. § 1605(a)(3).
152. Id. § 1606.
153. Id. § 1608.
154. Id. § 1610.
155. Id. § 1391(f).
156. See, e.g., id. § 1606 (providing that only an agency or instrumentality can be liable for
punitive damages); id. § 161 0(a)-(b) (providing that the property of an agency or instrumentality is
more exposed to attachment and execution of a judgment than that of a foreign state or its political
subdivision).
157. Id. § 1603(b).
158. Id. § 1603(b)(1).
159. Id. § 1603(b)(2). To qualify as a foreign state instrumentality under the FSIA, the foreign
state itself, rather than its subsidiary, must own a majority of shares of a corporation. See Dole Food
Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3).
161. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611,
626-27 (1983).
162. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
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juridical entity. 16 3 The Court recognized that governments increasingly
rely on separate legal entities to perform various tasks.' 64 Among other
common features, the Court characterized such instrumentalities as
entities that are typically created as separate juridical entities by statutes
that delineate their powers and duties; are managed by boards appointed
by the government; and are run as independent economic enterprises. 1
65
The Court went on to state that, in accordance with international and
federal common law, 166 the presumption that an instrumentality has
separate juridical status is inapplicable first, "where a corporate entity is
so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and
agent is created,, 167 and second, when adhering to the presumption
"would work fraud or injustice."' 168 Lower courts have followed this
approach in determining whether a court has jurisdiction over a foreign
state based on the acts of its instrumentality.' 69 They have also applied
the presumption to determine when the assets of an instrumentality are
subject to the execution of a judgment rendered against a foreign state. 7 '
Finally, one court has applied the presumption when deciding whether
an agency should receive constitutional treatment independent from that
of a foreign state. '
7
'
Although the Supreme Court in Bancec declined to provide a
"mechanical formula,"' 172 several factors may be relevant to the analysis
of an instrumentality's separate juridical status. 1 73 These include the
163. See id. at 613.
164. See id. at 624.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 623.
167. Id. at 629.
168. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939)).
169. See Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica De Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848-54 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1380-
83 (5th Cir. 1992).
170. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1066, 1072-74 (9th Cir. 2002);
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1984).
171. See TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Guided by Bancec, the TMR court held that a foreign state agency over which a foreign state has
plenary power is not entitled to constitutional status different from that of the foreign state. Id. at
301-02. The court noted that while the State Property Fund of Ukraine portrayed itself as not being
a "juridical equal" of the U.S., id. at 300, it was a "body of the State which implements national
policies ... subordinated and accountable to the Supreme Rada," the Ukrainian Parliament, id. at
302 (internal quotations omitted).
172. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633.
173. See Walter Fuller Aircraft, 965 F.2d at 1380 n.7.
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level of economic control exerted by the government and the degree of
management carried out by government officials; whether the
government receives the entity's profits or is otherwise the beneficiary
of the entity's operations; and whether acceptance of separate juridical
status would allow the foreign state to obtain the benefits of the U.S.
judicial system while evading its obligations. 174 Courts have followed
the Bancec approach when evaluating the separate juridical status of
foreign state instrumentalities such as banks, 175 telecommunication
companies, 176 an airline, 177 a not-for-profit foundation, 178 and a shipping
line, 79 and the separate constitutional status of a foreign state agent that
implemented national privatization policies.1
8 0
In sum, the FSIA applies not only to foreign states but also to their
political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. With respect to
instrumentalities created as separate juridical entities, the Supreme Court
has created a presumption of independent status. This presumption is
inapplicable when the foreign state extensively controls the
instrumentality or when such status would result in fraud or injustice.
V. SOME INSTRUMENTALITIES CAN ASSERT A PERSONAL
JURISDICTION DEFENSE IN A U.S. COURT
Even though foreign states are not "persons,"' 81 some foreign state
instrumentalities deserve constitutional status that is separate from that
174. Id.
175. See Bancec, 462 U.S. at 632-33 (refusing to treat a nationalized Cuban bank as a separate
juridical entity); Flatow, 308 F.3d at 1066 (treating a nationalized Iranian bank as a separate
juridical entity).
176. See Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia De P.R., Inc., 183 F.3d 1277, 1278, 1284-89
(11 th Cir. 1999) (treating a Cuban telecommunication company as having separate juridical status
from the Cuban government); Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 9 F. Supp. 2d 300,
304-05, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (treating a Peruvian telephone company as a separate juridical entity).
177. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 793-95, 799 (2d Cir. 1984) (treating Chile's
national airline as a separate juridical entity).
178. See Gabay v. Mostazafan Found. of Iran, 968 F. Supp. 895, 898-900 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(treating a not-for-profit foundation as a separate juridical entity).
179. See Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 846, 848-53
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that Venezuela was not amenable to suit based upon the actions of a
shipping line).
180. See TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 301-02 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(denying separate constitutional status to a foreign state agent that implemented national
privatization policies).
181. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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of foreign states.182 Instrumentalities that are "persons" may challenge a
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction regardless of whether they have
a voluntary and sufficient connection with the U.S. 183 When addressing
such a challenge, a federal court must evaluate the instrumentality's
contacts with the entire U.S.
184
A. Some Foreign State Instrumentalities Are "Persons "for Due
Process Purposes
The fact that an entity satisfies the definition of a "foreign state" for
FSIA purposes does not conclusively determine its status for Due
Process Clause purposes.18 5 When a foreign state or that state's political
subdivision owns a majority of a corporation's shares, that corporation
satisfies the FSIA's definition of an "instrumentality" and is treated like
a "foreign state" under the FSIA. 186 However, the Supreme Court in
Bancec, when determining whether it could attribute the acts and
liabilities of a foreign state to a state-owned instrumentality, mandated
that courts presume that instrumentalities established as separate
juridical entities are indeed separate. 187
Likewise, a court should presume that an instrumentality established
as a separate juridical entity is a separate entity from the foreign state for
Due Process Clause purposes.' 88 Such an entity is not like a sovereign-
a "juridical equal" of the U.S. that resolves its disputes with the U.S.
through the mechanisms of international law and diplomacy and does
not generally derive rights from the U.S. Constitution. 189 Rather, it is like
a private corporation-a limited entity that concerns itself with a specific
182. See TMR, 411 F.3d at 301-02; infra Part V.A-B.
183. See infra Part V.A-B.
184. See infra Part V.C; see also Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 1981).
185. See TMR, 411 F.3d at 301-02 (following Bancec and holding that a foreign state agency
over which a foreign state has plenary power is not entitled to constitutional status different from
that of the foreign state).
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2000).
187. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611,
626-27 (1983).
188. See TMR, 411 F.3d at 301.
189. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(stating that foreign states are "juridical equals" of the U.S.); In re Real Estate Title and Settlement
Serv. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 765 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that a school board is more like
a corporation than a state).
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and restricted purpose. 190 Private corporations, including foreign ones,
are entitled to due process protections. 19' Consequently, courts should
presume that foreign state instrumentalities, like private foreign
corporations, are "persons" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause. 192
Courts should employ the presumption of instrumentalities' separate
constitutional status, subject to the limitations established by the
Supreme Court. 193 In Bancec, the Supreme Court recognized two
situations in which the presumption of separate juridical status is
inapplicable. 194 First, an instrumentality cannot benefit from the
presumption when a foreign state extensively controls an instrumentality
such that its separate juridical status is illusory. 195 Second, adherence to
the presumption would be inappropriate if it would lead to an unjust or
fraudulent result by allowing the foreign state to obtain the benefits of
the U.S. judicial system while evading its obligations.' 96 An
instrumentality that does not implicate these exceptions, like a foreign
corporation, is a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause
and should be able to challenge a court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction on constitutional grounds. 197
B. A Personal Jurisdiction Defense Is Available to Instrumentalities
that Qualify as "Persons" and that Have No Connection with the
U.S.
Even though some constitutional protections would be unavailable
extraterritorially to an instrumentality that does not have a sufficient
connection with the U.S., such an instrumentality would be entitled to a
personal jurisdiction defense once haled into a U.S. court. For example,
the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not available to those who
have not established a sufficient connection with the U.S. 98 Applying
190. Cf Real Estate Title, 869 F.2d at 765 n.3.
191. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113, 116 (1987);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984).
192. See TMR, 411 F.3d at 301.
193. See id.
194. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S.
611,628-29(1983).
195. See id.; TMR, 411 F.3d at 301.
196. See Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629-30, 633-34; TMR, 411 F.3d at 301.
197. See TMR, 411 F.3d at 301.
198. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
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such a "sufficient connection with the U.S." requirement to personal
jurisdiction would have a peculiar result: a U.S. court would have power
over an instrumentality that has no contacts with, or property in, the U.S.
As noted by the Supreme Court, unlike the Fourth Amendment, which
applies to "the people," the Fifth Amendment uses broader language and
applies to "any person."' 99 Even though the personal jurisdiction
requirement has evolved from requiring actual power over the
defendant's person to requiring that a defendant have "minimum
contacts" with the forum,200 it remains a limitation on courts' judicial
201power. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in decisions that have
dismissed actions against foreign corporations on the basis of due
process, has not made mention of a "sufficient connection with the U.S."
requirement.20 2 In neither Asahi nor Helicopteros Nacionales did the
Court evaluate whether the defendants had a sufficient connection with
the U.S. prior to evaluating their "minimum contacts" with the forum.20 3
Cases holding that the executive branch is not constrained by certain
constitutional provisions abroad are not on point when considering the
powers and procedures of an Article III court.20 4 As Justice Anthony
Kennedy stated in his concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, "[a]ll
would agree ... that the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment protect the defendant" who is haled into a U.S. court.20 5
Thus, U.S. courts do not have limitless power over an instrumentality
that qualifies as a "person" and that does not have any contacts with the
U.S., because they must exercise personal jurisdiction in conformance
with the requirements of the Due Process Clause.20 6
199. See id. at 265 (emphasis added).
200. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 616-18 (1990).
201. See Ins. Corp. ofIr. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
202. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
203. See Asahi, 480 U.S. 102; Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. 408.
204. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Both Verdugo-Urquidez
and Eisenstrager concerned the conduct of executive branch officials abroad in relation to a
criminal prosecution, not the exercise of judicial power by an Article 1II court in the U.S. in a civil
proceeding. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269, 274-75; Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339 U.S.
763, 768 (1950).
205. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
206. See Ins. Corp. oflr., 456 U.S. at 702.
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C. A Federal Court Exercising Jurisdiction Under the FSIA Must
Consider an Instrumentality's Contacts with the Entire U.S.
Because an FSIA action arises under a federal statute that authorizes
worldwide service of process, federal courts, when faced with a
constitutionally valid challenge to personal jurisdiction, must evaluate an
instrumentality's contacts with the entire U.S.20 7 Every action brought
under the FSIA begins with the determination of whether it overcomes
the foreign state immunity bar and therefore arises under federal law
within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution.a°8 In order to
satisfy the FSIA's personal jurisdiction requirement, the defendant must
be served in accordance with the statute's service of process provision,
which authorizes worldwide service.20 9 Accordingly, in Weltover, the
Court's focus for "minimum contacts" purposes was not just the forum
state but the entire country.210 Despite discussing the defendant's
contacts with New York, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant
"avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
[United States].",21 Thus, when an FSIA action is brought in federal
court, "the relevant area in delineating contacts is the entire United
States," and not a particular state.
2 12
As a result, any federal court will have personal jurisdiction over an
instrumentality that is entitled to due process protections when that
instrumentality's contacts with the U.S. satisfy the Due Process
Clause.213 First, any federal court will have personal jurisdiction over an
instrumentality that has "minimum contacts" with the U.S. "such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' '214 Second, any federal court will have personal
207. See SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1997), dismissed on other grounds, 325
F.3d 1268 (11 th Cir. 2003).
208. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1983).
209. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(b), 1608 (2000).
210. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1992).
211. Id. at 620 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)) (internal
quotations omitted).
212. Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir.
1981); see also Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1545 (11 th Cir. 1993) ("The
relevant forum when a case is brought under the FSIA is the United States."). A plaintiff may bring
an FSIA action in state or federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605; Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 489.
Foreign states can remove any civil action from a state court to a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
213. See Tex. Trading, 647 F.2d at 314.
214. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
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jurisdiction over an instrumentality when the action against it arises from
conduct occurring within the U.S.2 15 Finally, any federal court will have
personal jurisdiction over an instrumentality in an action where process
was served in the U.S., assuming that service was made in accordance
with the FSIA service provision.21 6 Thus, an instrumentality lacking
"minimum contacts" with the U.S. may have a viable personal
jurisdiction defense only if both the conduct upon which the action is
based and service of process took place outside of the U.S.
VI. CONCLUSION
The exercise of jurisdiction under the FSIA with respect to
instrumentalities that are separate juridical entities not extensively
controlled by a foreign state, where separate constitutional treatment will
not result in a fraud or injustice, must be consistent with the Due Process
Clause. When facing a constitutionally valid challenge to personal
jurisdiction, a U.S. court will evaluate such an instrumentality's contacts
with the entire U.S. Effectively, absent waiver or consent to personal
jurisdiction, due process concerns will arise in FSIA actions that are
based on extraterritorial conduct where service of process was carried
out outside of the U.S. In those circumstances, a court will not have
personal jurisdiction over an instrumentality that does not have any
contacts with the U.S. Additionally, it will not have personal jurisdiction
over an instrumentality that has some contacts with the U.S. if those
contacts fall short of satisfying the "minimum contacts" test. In these
limited situations, despite the court having jurisdiction under the FSIA,
the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the Due
Process Clause.
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
215. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
216. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990). Of course any court will
also have personal jurisdiction over an instrumentality that waives its personal jurisdiction defense.
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).
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